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The article analyses the development of cognitive sociology of science, in the object field of which connection of cognitive and 
social structures of science is traced. The role of context in scientific knowledge formation is defined. It is stated that the basis for 
development of research program of cognitive sociology of science appeared to be reconsideration of the standard concept of 
science as a complex of gnoseological, epistemological and methodological interpretations of nature and morphology of the 
produced scientific knowledge, methods for its explanation and scientificity ideals. The difference between «strong» and «weak» 
varieties of scientific knowledge evolution, developed in western philosophy of science, is considered. «Social studies of science» 
are reviewed as a form of social constructivism and relativism, exhibiting their specific nature in macro-analytical and micro-
analytical strategies of scientific knowledge evolution analysis. The thesis that multidimensionality of science cannot be 
adequately interpreted focusing only on conceptual history of science is proved. 
 
© 2014. The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Tomsk Polytechnic University 
 




At the turn of the 20-21st centuries one of the basic vectors of science study in the problem space of western 
philosophy of science became a discipline, called in the English-American tradition «Sociology of Scientific 
Knowledge» (SSK). Within its framework there emerged research programs of «interpretative» sociology of science 
(G.Low, D.French), relativistic researches (W.Collins), ethno-methodological analysis (H.Garfinkel, S.Woolgar), 
ethnographic studies (Y.Elkan), thematic analysis (G.Holton), discourse analysis (М.Мulkay, G.Gilbert), 
constructivist orientation program (К.Knorr-Cetina). The obvious advantage of the outlined research programs is a 
view of science as an open object, as a culture subsystem. This research angle enabled to analyze the dependence of 
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scientific knowledge content on the context space of academic community. Scientific knowledge in this case was 
viewed as the result of social construction. 
Significance of studies lies in the fact that, for the first time, cognitive and socio-cultural factors and foundation 
for scientific evolution were presented as an integral and consistent research, thus encouraging the development of 
micro-sociological research. Furthermore, the scope of empiric data, obtained through these studies, will encourage 
discovering the nature of connection between cognitive and socio-cultural underpinnings of science development, 
which, will also set a base for efficient science management. 
 
2. Subject and research methods 
The author assumes that multidimensionality of science cannot be adequately interpreted only in terms of 
conceptual history of science. Synthesis of socio-cultural, sociological, methodological and gnoseological 
problematic is necessary. Within this research trend the subject of the analysis can be outlined as follows: 
? to reveal evolution of cognitive sociology of science, tracing within its subject framework the relation of cognitive 
and socio-cultural factors; 
? to interpret “Social Studies of Science” as a form of social constructivism and relativism which manifested itself 
in macro-analytical and micro-analytical strategies of scientific knowledge analysis; 
? to set conceptual core and potential of the contextual analysis of growing knowledge in «strong» and «weak» 
programs of “Social Studies of Science”. 
In the course of the designated research tasks potential of the historical method and comparative approach, as well 
as epistemological capability of socio-cultural methodology, method of structural-genetical analysis and  structural-
genetical synthesis were used. 
 
3. The results obtained 
In the 1970-s a number of scientific schools emerged in western philosophy under the name of “Social Studies of 
Science”. The program of the schools featured pronounced tendencies in western philosophy of science. Particular 
interest was shown to the analysis of content of scientific knowledge in its different forms, to science as a subsystem 
of culture, to establishing relation between single elements of scientific knowledge and socio-cultural context within 
which scientific knowledge is manufactured.  
The basis for developing this field, also known as cognitive sociology of science, as “New Wave” sociology of 
science, turned to be sociology of knowledge. Hence, the term “Sociology of Scientific Knowledge” was coined in 
English-American tradition. 
Preliminary to the analysis of issues concerning socio-cultural conditioning of science development was the 
controversy over internalism–externalism. For a long time this controversy influenced the structure of research foci 
(alternative and competing) in western philosophy of science. 
The conceptual ground constituting the subject of “Social Studies of Science”, was reconsideration of traditional 
concept of science (in 1967 I. Scheffler, professor of Harvard University, tried to organize the ideas of science 
sociologists, developed on the principles of traditional science, and introduced the term “normative concept of 
science”). Notably, the normative concept of science was a complex of gnoseological, epistemological and 
methodological interpretations of nature and morphology of the manufactured scientific knowledge, methods for 
obtaining and explaining this knowledge, interpreting ideals of scientificity, and mechanisms regulating this activity. 
Some authors (e.g. B.G.Yudin) are, to our mind, rightly assert that the core of the normative concept of science is 
trivial common sense of science, the very form of science self-cognition through which non-reflexive attitude to the 
foundation and prerequisites of scientific work manifests itself. Namely, positivists and neo-positivists were guided 
by the standard concept. Normative concept of science did not favor the potential of sociological analysis of scientific 
knowledge. Neo-positivists did not acknowledge socio-cultural conditioning of cognition. It was considered a factor 
baulking the formation of true knowledge. The normative concept produced a certain image of “pure” science, 
independent of culture. Basically, it is “Social Studies of Science” that created an ideal, aimed at overcoming 
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positivistic ideas of science and its development, in favor of versatile, integrated analysis of science as a product and 
an essential factor of the society development. 
Revision of the normative concept of science and emergence, at the turn of the 1980-s, of a range of conceptual 
patterns aimed at social studies of science within a framework of social constructivism justify the need for 
philosopho-methodological reflection of the holistic approach formed by this school. 
The emerged sociological scientific programs focused on the synthesis of philosophy, history and sociology of 
science in its conventional interpretation. Thus, an ideal-paradigm, integrating cognitive and social factors, was 
created.  It must be noted, that already by the middle of the 1970-s not only the general pattern of the “Social Studies 
of Science” paradigm was developed, but also a research team advocating the “strong program” made a statement 
(D.Bloor, B.Barnes). Both “strong” and “weak” programs, having chosen problems of sociology of scientific 
knowledge and nature of scientific knowledge as a subject of discussion, engaged in a hot argument (called “Science 
wars”) with “realists” opposing “post-modernists”. “Social Studies of Science” can be considered a branch of social 
constructivism and relativism: as a starting point of “strong” and “weak” programs, knowledge is viewed not as a 
reflection of reality, but as a result of some activity. Alternatively to this viewpoint, scientific realism, interpreted as a 
system of some fields within analytical philosophy, assumes that the only reliable way to attain knowledge about the 
world, alternatively to everyday experience and metaphysics, is scientific research where experimental and 
observational data are interpreted with special tools, i.e. scientific theories. Claims by the authors of scientific 
theories and definitions (without distinguishing “language of theory” and “language of observation”) have 
ontological status, i.e. objects (things, processes, connections, properties and relations, regularities) denoted by the 
terms are considered to be entities, while judgments about the objects can be true, false or probable (Porus, 2009). 
The latter viewpoint is supported by W. Sellars, А. Musgrave, H. Putnam, R. Harre. 
Evolution of cognitive sociology of science stimulated development of microsocial studies of particular situations 
emerging during scholars’ cognitive activity (case-studies), which provide extensive empiric data on relation between 
cognitive and social structures of science. In the 1980-s a variety of methodologically alike conceptual schemes of 
social studies of science emerged. The subject of the analysis was generation of scientific knowledge in the context 
space of academic community. As early as 1980-s there emerged “interpretative” sociology of science (J. Law, D. 
French), “constructivist program” (К. Knorr-Cetina, 1975), relativist program (W. Collins), discourse analysis (М. 
Мulkay, G. Gilbert), ethno-methodological studies (Г. Garfinkel, S. Woolgar), ethnographic studies of science (E. 
Elkan), thematic analysis (G. Holton) – the programs defined in analytical books as social-constructivists, because 
scientific knowledge is viewed here as a result and consequence of social  construction: “causality in society implies 
self-reference, which explains the obligation of convention” (Mulkay, 1983; Bloor, 1999). 
From the first half of the 1970-s Starnberg group from Max Planck institute in FRG engaged their attention to the 
issue of scientific knowledge dependence on socio-cultural context (V. Daele, V. Scheffer, G. Bohme, V. Кron). At 
the same period the ideas of cognitive sociology sprung in Great Britain, where such prominent sociologists as G. 
Collins, М. Мulkay, R. Whitley, D. Bloor, P. Weingart, Е. Mendelsohn were concerned with the study of the system 
“social factors – logical structures” (Mulkay, 1981). American branch of the sociology of science preoccupied with 
this research program is presented by P.McHugh, E. Goldner, I. Мitroff, М. Polanyi, G. Ravets. 
At the turn of the 20-21st centuries “Social Studies of Science” was recognized as a research area with a strong 
position in western philosophy of science. In the problem field of this area two varieties of socio-constructivist 
approach to the analysis of science outlined their subject matter. Within the macro-approach the following problems 
are analyzed: relations between social structures and scientific knowledge, influence of social changes on shifts in 
scientific knowledge, relations between science as a social institution and other social institutions. A specific of the 
macro-analytical approach is study of processes and structures and neglect of subjective aspect of science. Macro-
analytical strategy, assuming that science is scholars’ domain, disregards this idea. Limitation and insufficiency of the 
macro-analytical strategy caused a turn to micro-analytical strategy, which rejected global sociological structures and 
concentrated on case-studies of scientific discoveries, disputes between scientists, hypothesizing, creating theories in 
a certain socio-cultural context. 
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It is to be noted that of special importance for interpreting modern epistemological issues of cognitive sociology 
of science is E. Durkheim’s viewpoint, integrating such categories as time, matter, space, as well as some elements of 
causality with social context and identifying cognitive aspect of reason with social. It was V.Paretto and G. Simmel 
who came close to interpreting history of thought in sociological terms. They asserted parallelism between forms of 
cognition (definition coinage and ways of “intellectual grip”) and forms of social organizations, which proves, to 
their mind, conditioning of concepts and intellectual orientations by socio-cultural changes. Although the nature of 
cognition forms dependence on social context is approached differently in the history of sociology of knowledge, 
specifics of the subject field of sociology of science allowed later applying the methods and concepts of sociology of 
knowledge for the analysis of scientific knowledge stages, for the genesis of scientific discoveries, for the formation 
of scientific communities. Thus, R. Landsberg carried out a sociological analysis of Plato’s academy, P.Honigsheim 
described medieval scholasticism in terms of sociology of knowledge, А. Dempf and М. Оrnstein interpreted 
transition from scholasticism to modern science and the role of scientific societies in the 17th century in the context of 
sociology of knowledge. In some other works terms and methods of sociology of knowledge were deployed for 
historical and scientific descriptions. Transition from sociology of knowledge to sociology of science gave rise to 
various historical and scientific investigations, executing programs of sociology of science, while formation of a 
complex approach in the investigations of science became possible through the application of concepts and methods 
of sociology of knowledge and sociology of science to historical scientific research. So, for example, the founders of 
sociology of science R. Merton and D. Bernal were also the authors of historical and scientific investigations written 
from sociological perspective. Connection of sociology of scientific knowledge and history of science is conditioned 
by their unity, historical intentions of sociology itself: inner logic of its development demonstrates that both classical 
sociology, represented by E. Durkheim, and non-classical sociology, e.g. P. Bourdieu’s theory, inherently have 
historic character. E. Durkheim’s sociology is historical because he sought to study institutions in progress, which 
requires, to E. Durkheim’s idea, active and deliberate involvement of historiography. There is no sociology worthy of 
the name which does not possess a historical character, claimed E. Durkheim, being convinced that sociology and 
history were to come together and that one day historical and sociological spirits would differ only in shades. P. 
Bourdieu and other proponents of modern non-classical sociology adopt this and other E. Durkheim’s ideas, 
extrapolating historical dimension to social ontology and epistemology, proposing to work on really universal human 
science, where history would be historical sociology of the past, and sociology – social history of the present. They 
entrust sociology with a task of triple historicism – firstly, historicism of the agent, secondly, historicism of different 
social worlds (fields), thirdly, historicism of the cognizer and cognition tools, with which he constructs the object. 
Concerning the paradigm evolution of cognitive sociology of science, one cannot exaggerate the role of 
philosophical factors, – for example, Т. Kuhn’s works (Kuhn, 1975), positivist methodology. We consider that 
evolution of the research programs of the positivist methodology is conditioned by inner logic of the development of 
sociology as a discipline. In our opinion, this is due to paradigm transformations in sociology. Guidelines for 
interpreting the social changed. Especially it is typical for micro-sociological approach: the latter paradigm is guided 
by А. Schutz and I.Hoffman’s ideas. “Social” is interpreted here as a socially organized interaction, “shared world” 
(А. Schutz), as collaborative activity of individuals who positively complement each other. It outlines the scope of 
problems of cognitive sociology of science, caused by insuperable contradictions between “micro” and “macro” and 
the inability of sociology to overcome them. Interest expressed by symbolic interactionism to “microtranslation 
strategies”, explaining how social structures “are repeated” in interactants’ locations, as well as considerable interest 
of phenomenological sociology to the agent’s perspective resulted in changes in the social approach and science and 
called for such levels of analysis as everyday life and everyday contacts between scientists, i.e. anthropology and 
ethnography of science, which sociology of knowledge and sociology of science conceptually alienated from in the 
1970-s. In the 1980-s the leading position was taken by “ethnography of science” (anthropological study of science), 
that is micro-analysis of local historical situations in socio-cultural context. 
Today, when cognitive sociology of science is quite an autonomous discipline, thorough analysis of its social 
methodology and research methods (interview, involved observation, anthropology and ethnography of science, 
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biographical method, case-studies method), allowing to trace the genesis of scientific beliefs under the influence of 
cultural context, is vitally important, as sociology contributes greatly to the “deconstruction” of methodologies and 
methods used to investigate science problematics. The importance of social methodology is in refocusing to 
interpretative methods, emphasizing description strategies rather than explanation, i.e. the strategies which disregard 
causative or factorial explanation, stress narration of not only forms, methods and style of story, but also research 
methods. 
It is also necessary to note an attempt of research varieties of “Social Studies of Science” to consider not 
causality, which is a traditional type of connection in determinism, but milder forms of interaction between mental 
processes and social, or more exact, socio-cultural context. Among these forms is “principle of generalized 
interaction”, “principle of state relation”, “principle of dependence on conditions”, consideration of connections and 
synchronization, which disregard time precedence and compulsory generation and are not casual or random 
coincidences. In fact, understanding constructivist approach, centered on the analytical paradigm of cognitive 
sociology of science, allows concluding that it rejects philosophical analysis. As К. Knorr-Cetina aptly remarks, 
traditional philosophical analysis of science is charged with inability to systematically consider the role of social 
factors and include them in the normative pattern of scientific activity (Knorr et al., 1975). Actually, hardly can such 
phenomenon as modern science, internally connected with modern society as an institutional and collective 
establishment, be deprived of inherent social characteristics, which are to be grasped by philosophy, if it intends to be 
aware of the world where it exists. Constructivism poses the problem concerning role of interests, flexibility of rules 
and standardization of criteria of contextual role of power in the theory of knowledge, incites to abandon universal 
standards through local agreements, substitute social and other characteristics for situational characteristics. It should 
also be emphasized that, fundamentally, constructivism is by far not consistent, which is acknowledged by analysts-
proponents of cognitive sociology of science. The very fact that the central and basic concept of constructivism is the 
concept of “negotiations”, suggests limitation of its analytical resources. 
Apparently, recognizing the deadlock of the research theory of constructivism, analysts introduce the term 
“constructionism” to define empiric constructivism. Within the latter framework the initial thesis is that to study the 
process of constructing reality is to study epistemic issues, to analyze “laboratory life” and localized, variable 
standards of cognition. Constructionism is guided by the “localized” concepts, by the thesis that construction means 
construction of internally confined spaces, based on local resources and changes, and conditioned by local practice. 
Apart of the above mentioned issues, cognitive sociology of science branches out cognitive constructivism (as well as 
deconstructionism), investigating knowledge from the standpoint of cognition and perception biology, rather than 
social communities. It is characterized by anti-interpretationism, opposed to most interpretative approaches of social 
constructivism. The research area referred to as “deconstruction” is also presented in “Social Studies of Science”. In 
this context the difference between “weak” and “strong” varieties of social constructivism is as follows. Theories 
studying reality, emerged within the “weak” variety, are considered to be social constructions, while within the 
“strong” variety reality is viewed as construction. For D.Bloor, a proponent of “strong” variety of social 
constructivism, of special importance for social epistemology is “under-determination thesis”. It states that it is 
impossible to explain the difference in perception of the object by different observers simply appealing to the 
influence of the object. To explain one needs information about observers. Description of reality also includes criteria 
conditioned by social factors. For B.Latour and S.Woolgar, proponents of relativistic approach and D. Bloor’s 
opponents, the emphasis are laid not on scientific evidence, but the process of its construction (Latour, 1983; Latour, 
1999). Examining potential of the “strong” variety of social constructivism, J.S.Morkina, to our mind, keenly 
captures its relation to the “weak” variety of social constructivism and scientific realism, when she writes: “On the 
one hand, strong variety of social constructivism is manifestation of ultra-relativism. On the other hand, being an 
extreme it meets another extreme, i.e. scientific realism, rather than totally opposes it. The convergence lies in the 
fact that in both varieties definitions and statements of scientific theories are assigned with ontological status. In case 
with social constructivism it is due to the fact that reality itself is considered to be constructed during the process of 
scientific research” (Morkina, 2008).  
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“Social Studies of Science”, being a variety of social constructivism and relativism, proved that 
multidimensionality of science (cognitive-linguistic, social-normative, cultural-axiological) cannot be comprehended 
and interpreted correctly, taking into consideration only conceptual history of science. Having shaped a new research 
ideal, which promotes unity of social and cognitive characteristics, “Social Studies of Science” changed the concept 
of scientificity criteria in the cognitive research program, and highlighted the fact that scientific knowledge is directly 
conditioned by interpretative resources, interpretative context. Introduction of such categorical structures, as “socio-
cultural context”, “interpretative resources”, “interpretative context”, substantially changed the very idea of 
“sociality” in science. 
To conclude, it must be emphasized that it is western sociology of science that shaped the challenging, 
fundamental task to newly coordinate and re-orientate analytical approaches to such complex subject of research as 
social aspects of science operation, attempting to thematize the idea of complexity in social studies of science in 
terms of explicating basic programs and approaches in philosophy, history, cultural studies and sociology of science 




The conducted research allows modifying the current understanding of science within the context of the concept 
“sociality”, complementing it with the concept of “socio-cultural context”, fundamental for socio-cultural 
methodology. The author substantiates the difference between “strong” and “weak” varieties of social constructivism, 
and the thesis about heterogeneous nature of constructivism. It is proved by increasing interest to “constructionism” 
as a form and branch of empiric constructivism. Namely, “constructionism”, as is presented in the paper, studies 
epistemic practice, practices of “internally confined spaces” (e.g., “laboratory life”). Heterogeneity of constructivism 
is proved by “deconstructivism” theory. 
The author considers that developing a new research program aimed at thematization of the idea to synthesize the 
cognitive and the socio-cultural in the development of science, “Social Studies of Science” changes views on 
scientificity claims (knowledge is conditioned by “interpretative resources”, “interpretative context”), as well as 
transforms the idea of “sociality” in science. Furthermore, reorienting analytical approaches to social aspects of 
science functioning, developing the idea to synthesize cognitive and socio-cultural factors, western philosophy of 
science attempts to develop a unified integrated theory of science, able to synthesize programs and approaches of 
philosophy, history, cultural studies and sociology of science. 
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